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Statistical analysisPrivacy has always been a great concern of patients and medical service providers. As a result of the
recent advances in information technology and the government’s push for the use of Electronic Health
Record (EHR) systems, a large amount of medical data is collected and stored electronically. This data
needs to be made available for analysis but at the same time patient privacy has to be protected through
de-identiﬁcation. Although biomedical researchers often describe their research plans when they request
anonymized data, most existing anonymization methods do not use this information when de-identifying
the data. As a result, the anonymized data may not be useful for the planned research project. This paper
proposes a data recipient centered approach to tailor the de-identiﬁcation method based on input from
the recipient of the data. We demonstrate our approach through an anonymization project for biomedical
researchers with speciﬁc goals to improve the utility of the anonymized data for statistical models used
for their research project. The selected algorithm improves a privacy protection method called Condensa-
tion by Aggarwal et al. Our methods were tested and validated on real cancer surveillance data provided
by the Kentucky Cancer Registry.
 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction ing methods can be used by themselves or as parts of more com-The advances in Information Technology and the recent push
from the federal government [1] made Electronic Health Records
(EHR) systems widespread in the United States. Based on a survey
by the American Medical Association (AMA), 42% of physicians use
some kind of EHR system, and it is estimated, that by 2015 the cov-
erage will grow to over 80% [2]. Electronically collected biomedical
data needs to be made available for research but at the same time
patient privacy must be protected. This is a major challenge for the
Healthcare Data and Knowledge Management ﬁeld that has techni-
cal, management and policy implications.
Various approaches have been proposed to address privacy is-
sues regarding publicly released data. A popular solution is to mask
the original values of the attribute that could be used to identify
individuals. Perturbation based masking methods add random
noise to the original data values [3–8]. Data swapping techniques
exchange attribute values between different records [9,10]. Gener-
alization methods replace original values with more general ones
[11–13]. Suppression is a special format of generalization when
the value of an attribute is removed from the record. These mask-plex anonymization schemas.
Microaggregation and k-anonymity are two grouping based de-
identiﬁcation approaches that gained considerable popularity in
recent years [14–17]. The main idea behind them is to partition
the data into groups of similar records and then mask the quasi
identiﬁer attributes at group level so the records within a group
become indistinguishable. Multiple solutions have been proposed
to used as partitioning and masking methods to optimize these
anonymization methods [18,12,19,20].
The process of privacy preservation causes information loss,
which can be considered as loss of utility. To produce useful output
the data publisher has to balance the competing requirements of suf-
ﬁcient privacy protection and maximum possible utility. Table 1
shows an example of utility loss in privacy preservation [21]. {Age,
Insurance, Zip} canbeused to identify individuals in thedataset (quasi
identiﬁers). Diagnosis is a sensitive attribute. Screening shows
whether the individual is targeted for colon cancer screening or
not. Suppose that, in order to protect the sensitive attribute (Diagno-
sis), 2-diversity is required, so the quasi identiﬁers need to be modi-
ﬁed in such a way that based on the quasi identiﬁers {Age, Insurance,
Zip} each individual in the datasetwould be indistinguishable fromat
least one other person. Tables 1(A) and (B) are both valid 2-anonymi-
zations of the original data (records sharing the samequasi identiﬁers
have the same Group IDs). However, Table 1(A) provides more accu-
rate results than Table 1(B) when answering the following queries:
Table 1
Utility loss in privacy preservation.
ID Age Insurance Zip Diagnosis Screening
Original data:
1 54 No 40504 HIV Y
2 55 No 40509 HEP-B Y
3 60 HMO 40512 SM N
4 60 HMO 40517 HEP-B N
5 62 HMO 40524 HEP-B N
6 62 PPO 40525 Prostate cancer N
Group ID ID Age Insurance Zip Diagnosis Screening
De-identiﬁed data (A):
1 1 [54–55] No 4050X HIV Y
1 2 [54–55] No 4050X HEP-B Y
2 3 60 HMO 4051X SM N
2 4 60 HMO 4051X HEP-B N
3 5 62 Private 4052X HEP-B N
3 6 62 Private 4052X Prostate cancer N
De-identiﬁed data (B):
1 1 [54–60] Any 405XX HIV Y
2 2 [55–62] Any 405XX HEP-B Y
3 3 [60–62] HMO 405XX SM N
1 4 [54–60] Any 405XX HEP-B N
3 5 [60–62] HMO 405XX HEP-B N
2 6 [55–62] Any 405XX Prostate cancer N
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Q2: Is an individual with Age = 55, Insurance = No, Zip = 40509
targeted for colon cancer screening?
According to Table 1(A) the answer to Q1 is 2 and to Q2 is ‘‘Y’’.
But according to Table 1(B), the answer to Q1 is an interval [0, 4],
because 59 falls in the age range of record 1, 2, 4, and 6. The answer
to Q2 is ‘‘Y’’ or ‘‘N’’ with 50% probability each.
Two conclusions can be drawn from this example:
 Different anonymization leads to different information loss.
Tables 1(A) and (B) are on the same anonymization level but
Table 1(A) provides better results. Therefore, utility loss should
be minimized in privacy preserving.
 Data utility depends on the application. Q1 is an aggregate
query, so the data is more useful if the values are more accurate.
Q2 is a classiﬁcation query so the utility of the data depends on
how much the classiﬁcation model is preserved in the de-iden-
tiﬁed data. Utility is the quality of the data for the intended use.
To decide whether one de-identiﬁcation method preserves util-
ity better than another, we need to measure utility of the de-iden-
tiﬁed data compared to the utility of the original data. In practical
terms it means that we need to deﬁne a distance measure between
the original data and the de-identiﬁed data based on utility. The
content of this distance measure depends on the use of the data.
The followings are examples of utility measures used in the
literature:
 Query answering accuracy: Answering queries such as count,
average and sum is the most common use of published data.
The quality of query answering depends on the distance of each
original value from the corresponding value in the anonymized
dataset. A quantitative measure was introduced by Xu et al.,
which uses the normalized interval size to measure the utility
loss for numeric attributes and normalized number of descen-
dants in the generalization hierarchy to measure the utility loss
for categorical attributes [22,23].
 Classiﬁcation accuracy: The published data is often used to train
classiﬁers, therefore the data quality depends on how well the
class structure is preserved in the anonymized data. Fung
et al. propose a metric that measures entropy change duringanonymization [24,25]. Ideally, the entropy of an equivalence
class with respect to class label distribution should be mini-
mized in the published data.
 Distribution similarity: Statistical distribution is an important
characteristic of a dataset. A model which measures the differ-
ence between the distribution of the original and the anony-
mized data has been developed by Kifer et al. [26].
 Discernibility measure: Bayardo and Agrawal consider a discern-
ibility measure as a utility measure as they try to minimize the
equivalence class size while anonymizing the data [27]. The
more records are in an equivalence class, the less speciﬁc infor-
mation is preserved for those records.
 Generalization measures include Generalization Height [28],
which measures the total number of generalization steps
applied in the anonymization process. The idea behind this
measure is that generalization causes information loss and the
total number of generalization steps represents the total
amount of loss. The Loss Metric penalizes the generalization
made in that entry according to the size of the generalized sub-
set [29,30]. Ambiguity Metric is the average size of the Cartesian
products of all generalized entries in each record in the table
[30].
 Entropy based measures: Gionis and Tassa introduced entropy as
Mutual Information Utility Measure [31]. Private Mutual Infor-
mation Utility Measure builds on the previously mentioned
entropy measure and it quantiﬁes the mutual information
between the generalized public data and the private data [19].
The same de-identiﬁed dataset might be useful for one purpose
but useless for another. When researchers request de-identiﬁed
biomedical data, they already have a plan how they want to use
it. Yet, these research plans are rarely utilized when choosing the
de-identiﬁcation method. We believe that de-identiﬁcation meth-
ods should be tailored to the speciﬁc needs of the data recipient
when possible and that this customization should reﬂect in utility
measurements as well.
We present a de-identiﬁcation framework to address the need
for customized anonymization. Our approach investigates the
requirements of the data recipient and selects a suitable de-identi-
ﬁcation method that is speciﬁc to the requirements. We evaluated
our method by comparing it to three general purpose de-identiﬁca-
tion algorithms using utility measures that were speciﬁc to the
data recipient’s requirements.
Our experiments used real cancer surveillance data provided by
the Kentucky Cancer Registry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a
detailed review of related work. Section 3 explains the materials
and methods used in our experiments. Section 4 describes our re-
sults. Section 5 discusses some of the issues that arose during our
experiments and Section 6 concludes the paper and provides direc-
tions for future work.2. Related work
Most medical providers follow the Safe Harbor standard [32] in
the US when releasing data which removes 18 well deﬁned
identiﬁers from the dataset. Sweeney showed that removing obvi-
ous identiﬁers does not provide protection against privacy attacks
[33]. As a solution, k-anonymity was proposed by Samarati and
Sweeney [11]. k-anonymity divides the data attributes into quasi
identiﬁers, sensitive attributes and non-sensitive attributes and
creates equivalence classes by masking quasi identiﬁer attributes
in such a way that the quasi identiﬁer attributes of any record
would be identical to quasi identiﬁer attributes of at least k 1
other records. Achieving optimal k-anonymity is NP-hard
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sure, it does not prevent attribute disclosure. To address this weak-
ness Machanavajjhala et al. introduced l-diversity [36]. l-diversity,
in addition to k-anonymity, requires each equivalence class to have
at least l unique values for the sensitive attribute. k-anonymity and
l-diversity protect privacy effectively enough when the sensitive
attribute is a categorical variable. With a numerical sensitive attri-
bute however, an adversary might infer a ‘‘close enough’’ value to
jeopardize privacy. To address this issue Li et al. introduced t-close-
ness [37], which requires that, for each equivalence class, the dis-
tance between the distribution of the sensitive attribute in the
class and the distribution of the sensitive attribute in the whole
dataset must be smaller than a preset value t.
k-anonymity based techniques have multiple practical pitfalls.
They focus on datasets with categorical quasi identiﬁer attributes
such as race or gender. When the dataset contains numerical quasi
identiﬁer attributes, they are converted to categorical variables
(e.g. age can be converted to age intervals) [38]. Furthermore, the
quasi identiﬁer values are generalized or suppressed to achieve
homogeneity of the equivalence classes [28,18,39]. These conver-
sions lead to considerable loss of information in the de-identiﬁed
dataset [40,26]. Implementation of k-anonymity, l-diversity and
t-closeness together leads to competing requirements resulting in
large class sizes with undesirable amount of information loss
[36,37]. Furthermore, most implementations of l-diversity and t-
closeness assume that there is only one sensitive attribute in the
dataset. Extension of these principals to multiple sensitive attri-
butes is not trivial and, again, leads to unreasonably large class
sizes with signiﬁcant information loss [41–43].
Microaggregation is another privacy preserving approach
comparable to k-anonymity. Microaggregation focuses on numeri-
cal quasi identiﬁer attributes, though categorical quasi identiﬁer
attributes can be converted to binary dummy variables and han-
dled as numerical attributes [38]. Microaggregation clusters re-
cords in the dataset such that similarity among data points
inside the clusters is minimized and similarity among data points
in different clusters is maximized. Each cluster contains at least k
records, just like in k-anonymity. The quasi identiﬁer values are
masked in a way that is relevant to the cluster, they can be re-
placed with the cluster averages for example [44–46]. This way
the quasi identiﬁer values become uniform, making individuals
indistinguishable in a cluster. Achieving optimal multivariate mic-
roaggregation is NP-hard [47].
Microaggregation methods consist of two main steps, clustering
and masking. These steps can be manipulated independently to
minimize information loss. Clustering algorithms aim to achieve
optimal microaggregation and the level of information loss is usu-
ally the result of a trade-off between performance and time com-
plexity of the algorithm. Several heuristic clustering algorithms
have been proposed for microaggregation. Laszlo and Mukherjee
used a minimum spanning tree based method for clustering [44].
Chang et al. introduced a two-phase algorithm called Two Fixed
Reference Points (TFRP) [48]. Panagiotakis et al. proposed a succes-
sive group selection method based on sequential minimization of
SSE (sum of the within-partition squared error) [49]. The most
commonway of masking in microaggregation is to replace the qua-
si identiﬁer attribute values with the cluster averages [44–46]
which reduces variance and distorts covariance in the data. To ad-
dress this issue Domingo-Ferrer et al. proposed R-microhybrid, a
method that replaces the original data with synthetic data gener-
ated based on the mean and covariance of the original data in each
group. Since the mean and covariance are preserved in each group,
the mean and covariance of the entire data set are also preserved
[50]. Li et al. offer a microperturbation based solution by replacing
the data for each group using a statistical distribution with the
mean equal to the group average and some random noise thatrepresents the distortion in variance–covariance statistics caused
by the group average substitution [20].
There has been some research on privacy protection techniques
specialized for medical data and e-health. El Emam et al. published
extensively about privacy protection in the medical ﬁeld
[51–53,15,54,16,55–59,17]. Benitez et al. described a lattice based
automatic policy discovery algorithm which creates optimal de-
identiﬁcation policies to replace HIPAA’s static Safe Harbor [60].
A specialized anonymization technique was proposed to prevent
patient re-identiﬁcation through linking standard diagnosis codes
by Chen et al. [61]. Durham et al. published about their research
on using cryptographic techniques to link data across different
health care providers [62]. There is little privacy research in the
medical ﬁeld that shows interest in the utility of the de-identiﬁed
data based on the needs of the data recipient.3. Material and methods
To evaluate our data recipient centered framework we selected
a test project where we worked together with biomedical
researchers at the University of Kentucky. These researchers
requested de-identiﬁed cancer surveillance data to evaluate risk
factors in cancer. Together with the researchers we created a set
of requirements to measure utility. These requirements were
very speciﬁc to the statistical analyses outlined in their research
plans:
 The de-identiﬁed data should be in the same data space and
should use the same dimensions as the original dataset. Many
anonymization techniques transform the data into new data
space using PCA [63,64]. While the reduced dimensionality
might make data mining easier for a data mining specialist, it
adds an extra layer of complexity that makes the dataset useless
for the medical researcher. They prefer to use their standard
variables with their original permissible values.
 Basic statistics (average, sum, median) should not differ signif-
icantly after de-identiﬁcation.
 Selected statistical analysis should give similar results when
performed on the original data and on the anonymized data.
The deﬁnition of similar in this case is the following: Variables should not change signiﬁcance in a statistical
model. In other words, if a variable is signiﬁcant when
an analysis is performed on the original data, it should
remain signiﬁcant when the same analysis is performed
on the anonymized data. The same way, if a variable was
not signiﬁcant for the original data, it should not be signif-
icant for the de-identiﬁed data either when the same anal-
ysis is performed.
 Coefﬁcients should not change direction for signiﬁcant
variables. This means that if a coefﬁcient is positive for a
signiﬁcant variable when the targeted statistical analysis
is performed on the original dataset, it should be positive
when the same analysis is performed on the de-identiﬁed
dataset. It should be true the same way for negative
coefﬁcients.
 The values of the corresponding coefﬁcients should be
‘‘close’’ for signiﬁcant variables when the same analysis
performed on the original and on the de-identiﬁed data.
The deﬁnition of ‘‘close’’ is arbitrary in this case and
depends on the actual value of the coefﬁcient. In our
experimental evaluation we checked whether the value
of a coefﬁcient from the statistical analysis performed on
the de-identiﬁed data was in the 95% conﬁdence interval
of the corresponding coefﬁcient from the same statistical
analysis performed on the original data.
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tical methods were examined:
 Linear regression
 Logistic regression
 Cox’s proportional hazards model
These models are frequently used in biomedical research.
We considered k-anonymity and microaggregation based
methods when designing the customized de-identiﬁcation ap-
proach for this project. k-anonymity based methods use general-
ization and suppression to mask data values, it was unacceptable
based on our requirements. We decided to use a modiﬁed version
of the Condensation method introduced by Aggarwal et al. [46].
Condensation clusters similar records into groups just like micro-
aggregation techniques do. However, instead of masking only the
values of quasi identiﬁer attributes in the groups, condensation
replaces the values of all attributes with synthetic data that
was randomly generated based on the statistical attributes of
the original data. This decision is justiﬁed by the observation that
the traditional classiﬁcation of attributes as Quasi Identiﬁers, Sen-
sitive Attributes and Non-Sensitive Attributes is not always triv-
ial. For example, let us imagine a scenario where a celebrity is
admitted to a hospital. Let us also imagine that a pre-existing
medical condition of this celebrity is public knowledge. If a data-
set, that was de-identiﬁed using a k-anonymity or microaggrega-
tion based method, is released from the hospital for this time
period, we would probably be able to ﬁnd the group where the
celebrity belongs based on the publicly known demographics of
the celebrity. If both the known pre-existing condition and the
new diagnosis are listed in the dataset without masking then
we could infer the cause of the hospitalization with high
probability.
Our new anonymization techniques were evaluated by creating
de-identiﬁed datasets and performing the above listed statistical
analyses both on the original and the de-identiﬁed datasets. The
results of the analyses were compared.
3.1. The original condensation method
Aggarwal described the condensation method in [46]. The tech-
nique generates a synthetic dataset based on the distribution of the
original dataset. Similarly to previously discussed models the con-
densation algorithm creates groups in which the records would be
indistinguishable. Instead of masking the values inside the groups,
the condensation model creates synthetic random data based on
the statistical characteristics of the original data.
Deﬁnition 1 (Indistinguishability level [65]). A pseudo-dataset D
generated from the original dataset D is said to be k-indistinguish-
able, if every record X in D can be mapped to at least K recordsMðXÞ
in D. The record X is generated from MðXÞ using a randomized
algorithm which treats all records in MðXÞ symmetrically. There-
fore, X is equally related to all records in MðXÞ.
Next, we will describe the algorithm. It consists of two main
steps.
 First, the data is condensed into multiple groups with size of at
least K,which is referred to as the indistinguishability level. The
greater the indistinguishability level, the greater the amount
of privacy. At the same time, a greater amount of information
is lost because of the condensation of a larger number of recordsinto a single statistical group entity. The groups need to be cre-
ated in such way that the data points in the same group are
close to each other.
 Second, mean and covariance statistics are computed for each
cluster (condensation unit). The statistics of the cluster are used
to create pseudo data that preserves the mean and covariance
statistics of the original data.
Generalization of the group creation problem:We would like
to create groups of records in such way that each group represents
a tight cluster of data points, with each cluster containing at least K
data points. We would like to minimize an objective function WðÞ
which measures the average tightness within the clusters. An
example of such function could be the average intra-cluster dis-
tance between the data points, or the average centroid radius of
the clusters. For a given database D, partition it into s ¼ bN=Kc
groups C1 . . .Cs of at least K data points each, so that the objective
function WðC1 . . . CsÞ is minimized.
Theorem 1 (Condensation Problem). The condensation problem is
NP-hard.Proof. This is an instance of the balanced clustering problem, which
is NP- hard [66,67], even for K ¼ 3 for minimizing the intra-cluster
distance.
A heuristic algorithm has been designed to overcome the hard-
ness problem [65]. The method is shown in Algorithm 1. The input
of the algorithm is the dataset D and indistinguishability level K. In
step 2a, a random seed is chosen from D to start a group. In step 2b
the K  1 closest data points are added to the group. In step 2c the
group is removed from the dataset. This process is repeated
s ¼ bN=Kc times until the dataset is empty. Note, that a maximum
of K  1 records can remain after the last iteration. In step 4 these
records are added to their closest clusters. In step 5 the mean and
covariance statistics are calculated for each cluster and in step 6
the pseudo data is generated based on those statistics. Note, that
step 7 was added to transform the resulted pseudo data to the
same format as the original data, which is a requirement in our
experiments.
Algorithm 1. The original Condensation Algorithm [46,65]
Condensation (dataset D,K)
1. Let n be the size of D. Let s ¼ bn=Kc be the number of
clusters
2. For i ¼ 0 to s
(a) Randomly select Xi seed from the D. Move Xi to Ci
cluster.
(b) Select K  1 data points closest to Xi. Move them to Ci
cluster.
(c) D ¼ D Ci
3. End For
4. Add the remaining (max K  1) data points to their
closest cluster.
5. Compute mean and covariance statistics for each cluster.
6. Generate synthetic data for all attributes in each cluster
using the computed statistics.
7. (Addition by our requirements): Transform the data
values in the synthetic data to their original permissible
values.
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datasets with categorical attributes by using histograms instead
of means and frequencies of co-occurrences instead of covariance
[65]. However, this method assumes, that all attributes are cate-
gorical in the dataset because it is not possible to mix scalar covar-
iances with categorical frequencies to calculate dataset wide
statistics. Therefore, even though our data included categorical
attributes, we did not use this method. Instead, we converted the
categorical attributes to binary dummy variables which were after-
wards used as numerical attributes both at synthetic data genera-
tion and in our empirical evaluation with the regression models.3.2. The improved method
To be able to design a de-identiﬁcation algorithm that preserves
data utility speciﬁc to the statistical models listed previously, we
need to examine those models closely. We would like to ﬁnd the
statistical attributes which need to be preserved so these models
would give similar results when run on both the original data
and on the synthetic data.
 Linear regression is an approach to model the relationship
between a scalar variable y and one or more variables denoted
as X. Let us suppose that we have a patient dataset which con-
tains a number of attributes (m) about patients, such as age,
gender, race, geographic location, cancer stage, etc. (indepen-
dent variables). Let us also suppose, that we have a scalar vari-
able y, such as one that measures a diagnostic bio-marker in the
blood. We are interested in the relationship between the inde-
pendent variables and this diagnostic variable. In linear regres-
sion, the model is:y ¼ Xbþ e ð1Þ
where:y is the observations of the dependent response variable,
X is a N m data matrix as observations of independent
variables,
 b is the coefﬁcient of the model that we are trying to ﬁnd,
 e is the error.
If ordinary least square method is used, the estimated
b^ ¼ ðXTXÞ1XTy. Here XTX is the covariance matrix of the data
if the mean of each variable is set to zero. XTy is the covariance
between every column vector of X and the response variable
column y. So if we can preserve the covariance of the whole
data set (which includes both independent and response vari-
ables), we can preserve the linear regression model.
 Logistic regression model can be used in similar situations as the
linear regression model, the difference being that the
the response variable is binary (with value 0 or 1). Let pi be
the probability of response 1 for patient iwith independent var-
iable vector Xi. The logistic model is:logitðpiÞ ¼ ln
pi
1 pi
 
¼ Xibþ e ð2ÞThis can be seen as a modiﬁed linear regression model so the
requirement is the same as for the linear regression model.
 Cox’s proportional hazards model is widely used in biostatistics. It
allows analysis of the effect of several risk factors on survival.
Let us suppose, that we have a patient dataset which contains
a number of attributes (m) about patients, such as age, gender,
race, geographic location, cancer stage, etc. (independentvariables). Let us also suppose, that the dataset also contains
survival status and survival time. The attribute values, exclud-
ing survival status and survival time, for a patient i are repre-
sented by an m n matrix X. The probability of the endpoint
(death, or any other event of interest, e.g. recurrence of disease)
is called the hazard. The hazard is modeled as:hðtjXÞ ¼ h0ðtÞebT X ð3Þwhere:
 t is the time of the endpoint (survival time),
 hðtÞ is the hazard of dying at time t,
 X is the matrix of the independent variables (covariates)
that affect the hazard,
 b is the coefﬁcient of the model that we are trying to ﬁnd,
 h0ðtÞ is the baseline hazard. It indicates the instantaneous
risk for the respective individual when all independent var-
iable values (Xi) are equal to zero.
We can easily linearize this model:
ln
hðtÞ
h0ðtÞ ¼ b
TX ð4Þ
We now have a fairly ‘‘simple’’ linear model that can be readily
estimated.Assumptions. While no assumptions are made about the shape of
the underlying hazard function, the model equations shown above
do imply two assumptions.
 They specify a multiplicative relationship between the under-
lying hazard function and the log-linear function of the covari-
ates. This assumption is also called the proportionality
assumption. In practical terms, it is assumed that, given two
observations with different values for the independent vari-
ables, the ratio of the hazard functions for those two observa-
tions does not depend on time.
Consider, two observations i and i0 that differ in their X values,
with the corresponding linear predictors:gi ¼
X
i2D
bXi ð5Þandgi0 ¼
X
i2D
bXi0 ð6ÞThe hazard ratio for these two observations is:hiðtÞ
hi0 ðtÞ
¼ h0ðtÞe
gi
h0ðtÞegi0 ¼
egi
egi0
ð7ÞAs we can see, the ratio of the hazard functions for those two obser-
vations does not depend on time.
 The second assumption of course, is that there is a log-linear
relationship between the independent variables and the
underlying hazard function.
To build the model we need to compute b. Suppose Rj is the
set of patients who are at risk at time j (i.e., they died at some
time tk > tj) and patient i died at time ti. The conditional prob-
ability of patient i died at time ti given one of the patients at
risk at ti died equals
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l2RjhlðtÞ
¼ e
bT XiP
l2Rj e
bT Xl
ð8ÞIt is important to note that the baseline hazard function is can-
celed out. We can ﬁnd the coefﬁcient vector b that maximizes
the product of these conditional probabilities (i.e., maximum like-
lihood). To approximately preserve the model (b), we need to en-
sure that:
1. The risk set Rj is preserved.
2. The relative distance (similarity) between at risk patients
are approximately preserved.
The ﬁrst condition is straightforward because Rj is used in comput-
ing the conditional probability. Preserving the risk set Rj means
that the survival status and survival time attributes need to remain
unchanged.
We use an example to illustrate the second condition. Consider
three patients P1, P2, and P3. Suppose their survival times
are 12 months, 13 months, and 30 months, respectively.
Patient P1 and P2 also have more similar attributes compared
to P3. Clearly, when we anonymize the data, we can blur the
difference between P1 and P2 which will not introduce much
distortion, but we should not blur the difference between P1and
P3.3.3. Implementation of our model
We developed the following privacy protection method
(Algorithm 2) that achieves the above conditions. This method ﬁrst
divides the data set into two subsets D0 and D1, where D0 contains
the patients who died and D1 contains those who are still alive.
Only patient records in D0 will have impact on the proportional
hazard model because we do not know the outcome for
those who are still alive. Thus, it does not make sense to mix pa-
tients in D0 with D1 and the method will anonymize D0 and D1
separately.
The method then runs the k-means clustering algorithm [68] to
generate bni=kc clusters on each subset Di ði ¼ 0;1Þ. The objective
of k-means clustering is to minimize the average squared Euclid-
ean distance of data points from their cluster centers, where a clus-
ter center is deﬁned as the mean or centroid of the data points in a
cluster.
Survival time is the response variable in survival analysis
with proportional hazards model and it is important that pa-
tients with similar survival time be clustered together. For that
reason, we used weighted Euclidean distance function to calcu-
late the distances among the data points, with weight w as-
signed to survival time and the rest of the weight evenly
distributed across other attributes. Here, w is a parameter that
can be ﬁne tuned to perfect the clustering process. In our exper-
iments, w ¼ 0:5 gave good results. Different models with differ-
ent response variables might need to set the weights
accordingly.
Since some clusters may have fewer than k points and some
may have more, in step 2c the method moves points from larger
clusters to smaller ones to make sure each cluster has at least k
points. Step 2d ensures privacy protection by generating synthetic
data preserving the mean and covariance statistics of each cluster.
Thus, the difference between patients in the same cluster is
blurred. Since there are at least k patients in each cluster k-ano-
nymity (or k level indistinguishability by Deﬁnition 1) is satisﬁed.
Next, we show that this method satisﬁes the two conditions
necessary to approximately preserve the proportional hazard
model.Algorithm 2. Improved Anonymization Algorithm for Proportional
Hazards Analysis
Improved-Condensation (dataset D; k)
1. Divide D into two data sets D0 and D1 such that D0
contains patient records with survival status equals 0 and
D1 contains patient records with survival status equals 1.
Let n0 and n1 be the size of D0 and D1.
2. For i ¼ 0 to 1
(a) Run k-means clustering on Di to generate bni=kc
clusters using weighted Euclidean distance, where weight
w is assigned to the response variable in the statistical
model targeted, and the rest of the attributes receive equal
weight.
(b) Sort the clusters in ascending order of cluster size. Let
them be C1;C2; . . . ;Cs.
(c) For each cluster Cj that contains less than k patients,
ﬁnd k jCjj patients closest to the center of Cj that lie in
clusters that contain more than k patients. Move these
patients to cluster Cj.
(d) For each cluster Cj
i. Synthetic-Data-Generation: Compute mean and
covariance statistics. Generate synthetic data for all
attributes in each cluster using the computed
statistics except that the survival status attribute is
not changed. (See Algorithm 3)
ii. Sort the newly created synthetic data clusters by
Survival Time. Also sort the original Survival Time
values the same way. Assign back the original
Survival Time values to the synthetic dataset,
replacing the smallest synthetic Survival Time value
with the smallest original Survival Time, so on. This
way we ensure that the synthetic dataset preserves
the original Survival Time values and also the
correlations are preserved in the synthetic dataset.
iii. Transform the data values in the synthetic data to
their original permissible values.
(e) End For
3. End For
Note, that for proportional hazards analysis, the risk set Rj
depends on both survival status (only those patients who already
deceased are in the risk set) and survival time (any patient in the
risk set who survives longer than time tj belongs to Rj). The above
algorithm does not modify survival status and survival time, thus
the risk set Rj is preserved. For condition 2, the distance function
used in the clustering step considers both the similarity based on
survival time and the similarity based on other attributes, so pa-
tients with similar survival time and other similar attributes are
more likely to be assigned to the same cluster. Thus this condition
is satisﬁed as well. For example, using the example from the previ-
ous section, patients P1 and P2 are likely to be assigned to the same
cluster while P3 is likely to be assigned to another.
Our method bears some similarity with the condensation ap-
proach [46,65]. However, the condensation approach has three
drawbacks that needed to be improved:
 The condensation algorithm picks cluster centers randomly, so
it may generate inferior clusters. We improved the algorithm
by using k-means clustering, which is reasonably efﬁcient in
the sense of within-class variance [68]
 The condensation algorithm assigns equal weight to all attri-
butes, including survival time, so patients with similar survival
time may not be assigned to the same cluster. Our algorithm
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cantly larger weight assigned to survival time than other attri-
butes to ensure that records with similar survival time are
clustered together.
 The condensation algorithm does not consider the difference
between patients who are in the risk set (deceased) and patients
who are not (alive). Our algorithm separates these two classes
and de-identiﬁes them independently.
The synthetic data generation method (point 2di in Algorithm
2) is described in Algorithm 3. The input is a cluster that contains
similar data points. In step 1 the data in the cluster is shifted to a
new data space using Principal Component Analysis (PCA). In this
space, the data components Z1; Z2; . . . Zp are independent. In step
2 random data Z0i is generated with the statistical characteristics
of Zi. In step 3 the random independent Z
0
1; Z
0
2; . . . Z
0
p components
are combined into one dataset Z0. Finally in step 4 Z0 is shifted back
to the original data space using reverse PCA and C0j is created. C
0
j has
the same attributes as Cj had. The means and the covariances
among the attributes are preserved.
Algorithm 3. Synthetic Data Generation
Synthetic-Data-Generation (Cj)
1. Using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) shift the data
in the cluster into a new space (Cj ! Z), creating
independent components Z1; Z2; . . . Zp.
2. For each independent component Zi
(a) Generate random data Z0i with normal distribution
such way that
jZ0ij ¼ jZij,
lZ0i ¼ lZi and
rZ0i ¼ rZi
3. Combine Z01; Z
0
2; . . . Z
0
p into one dataset Z
0 in an orderly
manner
4. Using reverse PCA shift Z0 back to the original data space
(Z0 ! C0j)
5. Return C0j
The algorithm was implemented using the R statistical soft-
ware. The data was stored in a MySQL database.3.4. Complexity of our model
Let n be the number of records, m be the number of attributes
and s ¼ bn=Kc the number of clusters. The cost of k-means cluster-
ing is OðIsnmÞ [69], where I is the number of iterations run to reﬁne
clustering. Even though the complexity is linear to the number if
iterations, the number of clusters, the number of records and the
number of attributes, it can be costly if the number of iterations gets
out of control, so statistical software packages usually offer a
parameter to set themaximumnumber of iterations to a reasonable
limit. In the R statistical software it is set to 10 by default. The cost
of PCA for one cluster is OðKm2Þ, as K is the approximate number of
records in the cluster. This needs to be done s times, so the cost of
computing PCA for the whole dataset is OðsKm2Þ ¼ Oðnm2Þ. So the
cost of the whole algorithm is OðIsnmþ nm2Þ ¼ Oððmþ IsÞnmÞ.
PCA is causing the algorithm to be square in terms of the num-
ber of attributes. This is usually not a problem in patient datasets
where nom. For high dimensional datasets where nnm, such
as genetic or imaging data, we can use a method that is referred
to as the PCA transpose trick and has been used when generating
eigenfaces [70–72]:Proposition 1. Let us suppose that we have an m n observation
matrix A, where nnm. To ﬁnd the PCA of A, we need to compute the
eigenvectors of the large mm covariance matrix ATA, which is
computationally difﬁcult. Instead, we can compute the eigenvectors of
the n n matrix AAT , because if v is an eigenvector of AAT , then ATv is
an eigenvector of ATA.Proof. Let v be an eigenvector of AAT with eigenvalue k. Then
ðAATÞv ¼ kv
ATðAATvÞ ¼ ATðkvÞ
ðATAÞðATvÞ ¼ kðATvÞ
so ATv is an eigenvector of ATA, with eigenvalue k. Therefore,
instead of computing the eigenvectors of ATA directly, we can
compute the eigenvectors of AAT and multiply those from the left
by AT .
This way the complexity of PCA can either be Oðnm2Þ or Oðn2mÞ,
depending on the dimensionality of the data. So the cost of the
whole algorithm is either Oððmþ IsÞnmÞ or Oððnþ IsÞnmÞ.3.5. Experimental evaluation
We developed a utility based de-identiﬁcation method based on
the preservation of speciﬁc statistical qualities of the data. The
promise of doing this is that statistical models based on these pre-
served statistics would return comparable results when run on the
anonymized dataset, as if they were run on the original data. In the
experimental evaluation we prove that our model:
 Works reliably and is able to produce statistically consistent
output.
 Is scalable in terms of cluster size (K).
 Is scalable in terms of the number of attributes.
 Is scalable in terms of the size of the dataset.
The experimental evaluation was conducted with the following
setup:
 The computational environment: The tests were run on a vir-
tual machine in a Dell PowerEdge R610 virtual environment
with 4 CPU cores and 8 GB RAM assigned to the virtual machine.
The operating system was Ubuntu Linux 10.04 Server. The algo-
rithms were implemented in the R Statistical Package. The data
was stored in a MySQL database.
 Thedata: Two cancer surveillance datasetswere used for testing.
The ﬁrst contained data of colon cancer (N ¼ 9;552), and the sec-
ond of lung cancer (N ¼ 17;421) patients who were diagnosed
between 2004 and 2009. The variables in the datasets were: VitalStat (vital status): Whether the patient was alive at
the time of last contact (categorical)
 SurvInterval (survival time): The time elapsed between the
time of the diagnosis and either the time of death or the
time of last contact (scalar – integer)
 DiagAge (diagnosis age): Age at diagnosis (scalar – integer)
 Gender: The gender of the patient (categorical)
 Race: The race of the patient (categorical)
 Stage: Cancer stage at the time of the diagnosis (categorical)
 Appalachia: Whether the patient lives in Kentucky’s Appa-
lachian region. The Appalachian region is a predominantly
rural area with high poverty rate, lower education levels
and less access to health care. Cancer rates are the highest
in the Appalachian region in the whole United States
(categorical)
 TobaccoUse (tobacco usage): Whether the patient used
tobacco products or not (categorical)
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Permissible values include {private insurance, federal pro-
gram, uninsured}.
 Statistical models: The following statistical models were used
in the R statistical software: Linear regression:
Stage, Gender, Race, Appalachia, TobaccoUse and Primar-
yPayor were used as predicting variables with SurvInterval
(survival time) as the response variable. The research
question was: How do cancer stage, gender, race, geographic
location, tobacco usage and health insurance status affect the
survival time of the patients? Categorical attributes (Stage,
Race and PrimaryPayor) were changed to binary dummy
variables. Only the records where VitalStat = 0 (deceased
patients) were used for this analysis.
 Logistic regression:
The same variables were used as for linear regression with
the difference of variable SurvInterval, which was con-
verted to binary variable here (low or high survival time).
The rational here is to build a model that predicts whether
a patient would have low or high survival time. Only the
records of deceased patients were used for this analysis
as well.
 Cox’s Proportional Hazards Model:
DiagAge, Gender, Race, Appalachia, Stage, TobaccoUse and
PrimaryPayor were used to build a model to assess the risk
factors contributing to the death of cancer patients. Surv-
Interval (survival time) and VitalStat (vital status) form a
survival object in this survival analysis.
 Metrics: Our requirement was to preserve information in the
data, such that speciﬁc statistical analyses would yield similar
results when run on the original and the de-identiﬁed data.
We evaluated our method by measuring the change in the
parameters of the statistical models (coefﬁcients) before and
after anonymization. The followings metrics were reported after
the statistical models were built based on both the original and
the synthetic datasets: Percentage of coefﬁcients changed signiﬁcance.
 Percentage of signiﬁcant coefﬁcients changed direction.
 Percentage of the new coefﬁcients were out of the 95% con-
ﬁdence interval of the original coefﬁcients.
We used conditional privacy to measure the privacy of the de-
identiﬁed data [73]. Conditional privacy is an average measure
of privacy that was originally proposed in context of distribu-
tion reconstruction after additive perturbation. The measure is
based on the differential entropy of a random variable. The dif-
ferential entropy of A, given B ¼ b is:
hðAjBÞ ¼ 
Z
fA;Bða; bÞlog2fAjB¼bðaÞdadb
XA;B
ð9Þ
where A is a random variable describing the data, and B is another
random variable giving information on A. XA;B deﬁnes the domain of
A and B.
The average conditional privacy of a random variable A, given B, is:PðAjBÞ ¼ 2hðAjBÞ ð10ÞThis measure will be used in the context of A to be a random vari-
able in the original data and B the corresponding random variable in
the de-identiﬁed data. If conditional entropy between A (original
data) and B (synthetic data) is zero then A and B are identical so
there is no privacy preserved. The greater the conditional privacy,
the greater the privacy protection is. Algorithms: We compare our algorithm to a commercially
available anonymization system, the original condensation
method and the TFRP algorithm. The following naming conven-
tions were used: Commercial: We used a commercially available de-identiﬁ-
cation software which achieves k-anonymity through a
heuristic algorithm using generalization and suppression.
 Condensation: The original condensation algorithm [46,65].
 TFRP: Two Fixed Reference Points (TFRP) method [48]. We
chose TFRP in our comparison as it is one of the fastest
microaggregation algorithms that achieved similar utility
as other slower algorithms in the ﬁeld. TFRP is a two-phase
method for microaggregation. In the ﬁrst phase, TFRP uses
the pre-computing and median-of-medians techniques to
shorten its running time. In the second phase, TFRP gener-
ates variable-size groups by removing the lower homoge-
neous groups to reduce the number of groups and to
improve the data quality. The time complexity of this algo-
rithm is Oðn2=kÞ.
 Improved: This is our algorithm, which is an improved ver-
sion of the condensation method.
To make sure that our algorithm performs consistently and that
the resulting datasets are similar, we repeated each test cycle
one hundred times including the synthetic data generation.
Each cycle was evaluated independently and the averages are
reported here.
4. Results
4.1. Utility preservation
For this ﬁrst test we used K = 100. We ran the three statistical
analyses on all original and de-identiﬁed datasets and compared
the coefﬁcients from the models resulted by analyses run on
the original datasets to the coefﬁcients from the models resulted
by analyses run on the anonymized datasets. For the proportional
hazards model we compared the expðcoef Þ values (the exponen-
tial values of the coefﬁcients) as they give the hazard ratios and
those are the parameters from the model that are used in
practice.
 The percentages of the coefﬁcients that changed signiﬁ-
cance: Fig. 1 shows the percentages of coefﬁcients that changed
signiﬁcance when anonymized. For this measure, the smaller
percentage means better utility preservation. Preserving signif-
icance is important for researchers to decide which variables
have real effect on the outcome.
As Fig. 1 shows, our improved algorithm performed the best,
with performance between 1.85% and 26%. The percentage of the signiﬁcant coefﬁcients that changed
direction: Fig. 2 shows the percentages of signiﬁcant coefﬁ-
cients that changed direction after de-identiﬁcation. For this
measure again, the smaller percentage means better utility
preservation. The direction of a coefﬁcient gives information
about the direction of the change in the outcome given the cor-
responding attribute changes and as such it is important to pre-
serve after de-identiﬁcation. It would tell us for example,
whether smoking has positive or negative effect on survival
time. For the proportional hazards model the exp (coef) values
are used in practice. The exp (coef) values show how the change
of an attribute affects the overall risk. When the coefﬁcients
change direction in this case, the exp (coef) values change
whether they are smaller or larger than one. Since the hazards
are proportional to the exp (coef) values, they change the risk
Fig. 1. Coefﬁcients changed signiﬁcance.
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they are smaller.
As Fig. 2 shows, our improved method performs best among the
de-identiﬁcation methods, and it works signiﬁcantly better for
the lung cancer datasets. A possible explanation is that since
lung cancer is much more aggressive and shorter in duration,
these effects might be more exaggerated with less co-morbid-
ity. Therefore the relations are clearer and they are easier to
pick up for analysis. The percentage of the coefﬁcients that were outside of the
95% conﬁdence intervals of the original coefﬁcients: The
actual value of the coefﬁcients tell the multiplicative effect of
the variable on the outcome (Again, the smaller the percentage,
the better the utility preservation). We consider it signiﬁcant
distortion in the statistical model if a coefﬁcient in the de-iden-
tiﬁed model deviates from its twin coefﬁcient in the original
model by more than the 95% conﬁdence interval of the original
coefﬁcient. Fig. 3 shows, that our improved method performs
best among the algorithms.
Although TFRP and our improved method have similar utility
for linear regression and logistic regression, our method signiﬁ-
cantly outperforms TFRP for the Cox regression model, probably
because our clustering algorithm is speciﬁcally tuned to preserve
Cox regression model (e.g., our method puts more weight on sur-vival status and survival interval and never puts patients with dif-
ferent survival status into the same cluster).
 Privacy: Fig. 4 shows the conditional privacy measures for the
de-identiﬁed datasets. Based on this measure the Condensation,
TFRP and Improved algorithms provide similar privacy
protection.
4.2. Scalability
We compared the scalability of the tested de-identiﬁcation
methods in three areas:
 Cluster size (varying K)
 Number of variables (varying m)
 Number of records in the dataset (varying n) Scalability in terms of cluster size
In this test, we varied the cluster size (K = {10, 20, 50, 100, 200,
500}), while keeping the number of the variables and the data-
set size unchanged. The upper limit for the commercial de-iden-
tiﬁcation tool was K = 100, that is why the blue line ends before
the others. We report the execution time as a measure in Fig. 5.
Cluster size (K) should not affect the execution time of our
model signiﬁcantly as it was canceled out in the complexity
calculation. However, as Fig. 5 shows, the execution time
Fig. 2. Signiﬁcant coefﬁcients changed directions.
T.S. Gal et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 50 (2014) 32–45 41decreased at ﬁrst as K increased until about K = 50, then it
increased again. The reason for this can probably be found in
the implementation of the algorithm. Execution time consists
of CPU (central processor unit) time and disk read/write time.
In the complexity calculation we only examined CPU time.
Our algorithm was implemented utilizing a database system.
Database systems utilize many techniques that affect execution
time, such as caching or indexing. Database systems usually use
hard disk drives to store data, which makes reading and writing
operations time consuming. To overcome this handicap, mem-
ory tables were used in the database. Writing to and reading
from the memory is considerably faster than disk operations,
yet it still requires time. This could be the reason behind the
shape of the curve for the improved algorithm in Fig. 5. The
majority of the read and write operations occur at two phases
in the improved algorithm (Algorithm 2): Cluster creation (2a in Algorithm 2): Even though overall
the same amount of data is read and written when we pro-
cess the same dataset using different K values, it is done in
different packaging. When K is small, the size of the data is
smaller, but the number of clusters is larger; so smaller
amount of data need to be read and written many more
times. When K is large on the other hand, there are fewer
clusters, so larger amounts of data are read and written
less times. This can conﬂict with the caching policy ofthe database system making it more time consuming to
write small amounts of data repeated many times.
 Moving data points from larger clusters to smaller ones to
ensure K-indistinguishability. In this case disk reading and
writing time depends on the number of data points that
need to be moved among clusters to make the clusters
nc P qK (2b and 2c in Algorithm 2).
To asses how read/write times affected the execution time, we
measured the time needed for cluster creation and moving
records from larger clusters to smaller ones separately (Fig. 6).
Fig. 6 shows the averages of ten measurements for various K
values (K = {10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500}). The time used for read
and write operations was almost constant as K varied, with
almost zero standard deviation. On the other hand, the time
needed for moving records from larger clusters to smaller ones
closely imitated the shape of the overall chart in Fig. 5. It is not a
requirement for K-means clustering to create clusters with
equal number of records and it does not seem to do well when
the cluster size is too small or too large. To compensate this
weakness, the improved algorithm needs to move more records
from larger clusters to smaller ones when K is too small or too
large. Another interesting fact to notice is the large standard
deviation in this second line. This can be explained by the
random nature of K-means clustering.
Fig. 3. Coefﬁcients outside of the 95% conﬁdence interval of the originals.
Fig. 4. Average conditional entropy.
Fig. 5. Execution time when varying K.
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Fig. 6. The effect of read and write operations when varying K. Fig. 8. Execution time when varying the size of the dataset.
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execution time does not change signiﬁcantly for the improved
method. It also performs well compared to the two other algo-
rithms in this interval. Scalability in terms of the number of variables
For this test we varied the number of variables between 2 and
13 (m = {2, 4, 8, 13}) while keeping K = 100 and the size of the
dataset unchanged. As we showed earlier, our improved
method has square relationship in time complexity in terms
of the number of dimensions because of the PCA calculation.
We also showed the PCA transpose trick, which can be used
for datasets with high dimensionality. Our empirical results
did not expose the square relationship. A possible reason for
this is that the overhead coming from disk input–output opera-
tions probably dwarfs the effects of the PCA calculation. Our
improved algorithm performed well, especially when compared
to the commercial de-identiﬁcation tool in higher dimensions.
(Fig. 7). The commercial tool is a proprietary software. It imple-
ments k-anonymity through a heuristic lattice search which
seems to become complex at higher dimensions. It also uses a
database system to store the data during de-identiﬁcation
which means disk operations and other overhead. On the other
hand, k-anonymity only masks quasi identiﬁers. The number of
quasi identiﬁers is usually no more than ﬁve or six, in which ter-
ritory the commercial tool performs well.
 Scalability in terms of dataset size
For this test we varied the size of the dataset between about
10,000 and 430,000, while keeping K and the number of vari-
ables unchanged. We created larger datasets by combining the
original datasets with synthetic data. According to our complex-
ity calculation, dataset size is in linear relationship with time
complexity, unless we use the PCA transpose trick for high
dimensional data. Our empirical results show an almost linear
relationship between the size of the dataset and execution time
except for the TFRP algorithm, which has a square relationship
between N and time complexity. The improved method showed
considerable variation in terms of execution time when experi-
ments were repeated with the same settings. Just as previously
in the cluster size experiments, this variation can be explainedFig. 7. Execution time when varyby the random nature of K-means clustering.
Another interesting observation is the slightly sub-linear nature
of the curves in Fig. 8. Since all these models were implemented
utilizing database systems, the explanation for this anomaly can
probably be found in the decreasing overhead in database
operations at larger datasets. In other words, database optimi-
zation seems to work better when larger chunks of data are
moved.
5. Discussion
De-identiﬁcation is a balancing act between privacy and utility
preservation. The most common approaches to de-identiﬁcation
are generalization and suppression, which, by deﬁnition, operate
on the basis of information loss. As we showed in this project, an
alternative solution is synthetic data generation. The promise of
this approach is to generate synthetic records thatmight have come
from the same population as the original records. Yet, usage of syn-
thetic data is not widespread, possibly because of the resistance of
the biomedical research community. It needs to be studied whether
researchers arewilling toworkwith synthetic data andwhether the
biomedical research community is ready to accept the results pro-
duced using synthetic data as equivalent to results coming fromori-
ginal data. This is an area where research can be extended.
Although our anonymization approach was purposefully cus-
tomized to the needs of the data recipient, we can still investigate
whether it is generalizable or not. Generalization of our methods
can be addressed on two levels:
 Our customization approach can be generalized and used for
other projects, namely: Ask for input from the data recipients about their data
usage plans (mining methods, statistical analyses, etc.).
 Analyze the proposed data mining and statistical models.
 Design a de-identiﬁcation method that will minimally
obscure the data while ensuring privacy.
 Our actual anonymization method designed for this particular
project can be generalized to the use of any covariance based
statistical models as we showed that our method preserves
covariance in the data.ing the number of variables.
44 T.S. Gal et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 50 (2014) 32–45Although our de-identiﬁcation method was presented and
examined in the biomedical domain it can be readily applied in
other areas where privacy is a concern.6. Conclusions
This paper proposed a data recipient centered utility based de-
identiﬁcation framework. In this framework we ask the data reci-
pient about their plans regarding the data, carefully analyze the
proposed data mining and statistical models and design a custom-
ized de-identiﬁcation approach that is speciﬁc to the needs of the
data recipient. In our test project the requirements were to pre-
serve statistical attributes speciﬁc to three statistical models. After
analyzing these models, we designed a microaggregation method
where both the clustering and the algorithms were speciﬁc to
the project requirements. We measured the performance of our
method using utility metrics that were speciﬁc to the data recipi-
ent’s requirements as well and showed that our customized meth-
od performed better than other general de-identiﬁcation
algorithms.
We will continue working with biomedical researchers to fur-
ther explore the beneﬁts of providing customized de-identiﬁcation
solutions. We are planning to extend the scope of this research to
other statistical models and classiﬁcation algorithms.References
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